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Urban Floods, Clientelism, and the Political
Ecology of the State in Latin America
Robert Coates

and Anja Nygren†

Sociology of Development and Change Group, Wageningen Universiteit
†Department of Development Studies, University of Helsinki
In this article, we examine the coproduction of hazardous urban space and new formations of clientelist state
governance. Work on hazards and vulnerability frequently demonstrates how hazardous urban spaces are
produced, but a critical understanding of state power is often left untouched. Correspondingly, scholars
analyzing clientelism and state formation habitually discuss the configuration of new forms of governance
and the consolidation of state power without intersecting these processes with the production of
vulnerabilities and “hazardous nature.” Drawing on ethnographic research in urban areas susceptible to
serious floods and landslides in Brazil and Mexico, we argue that clientelist governance and state making,
including complex forms of political favoritism, create urban hazardscapes, as much as the management of
urban disasters acts to reconfigure patron–client relations within “hazardstates.” The article contributes to an
emerging body of literature analyzing linkages between urban environmental governance, state authority, and
the reproduction of vulnerability. Key Words: clientelism, hazardscapes, Latin America, political ecology, the
state, urban floods.
在本文中，我们考察了危险城市空间的附加产生以及新形式的侍从主义国家治理。很多关于危
险和脆弱性的文章都展示了危险的城市空间是如何产生的，但是这些作品往往没有触及对国家
权力的批判性理解。相应地，分析侍从主义和国家形成的学者会习惯性讨论新治理形式的配置
与国家权力的巩固，但没有将这些过程与弱点与“危险性质”进行交叉联系。根据对巴西和墨西
哥易受严重洪水和山体滑坡影响的城市地区进行的人种学研究，我们认为，侍从主义治理和国
家决策（包括复杂形式的政治偏袒）制造了城市危险现象，正如城市灾害管理会在“危险地带”
内重塑侍从关系。本文有助于构建一个分析城市环境治理，国家权威和脆弱性再生之间联系的
全新文献体系。 关键词: 侍从主义，危险现象，拉丁美洲，政治生态，国家，城市洪水。
Este artıculo esta dedicado a examinar la coproduccion de espacio urbano peligroso y las nuevas formaciones de
gobernanza estatal clientelista. Con frecuencia el trabajo sobre riesgos y vulnerabilidad demuestra como se producen
los espacios urbanos peligrosos, pero una comprension crıtica del poder del estado a menudo se deja sin considerar.
Al respecto, cuando los eruditos analizan el clientelismo y la formacion del estado habitualmente discuten la
configuracion de nuevas formas de gobernanza y la consolidacion del poder del estado sin que asocien estos procesos
con la produccion de vulnerabilidades y “naturaleza peligrosa”. Con base en investigacion etnografica en areas
urbanas susceptibles a inundaciones de cuidado y deslizamientos en Brasil y Mexico, sostenemos que la gobernanza
clientelista y la construccion de estado, incluyendo formas complejas de favoritismo polıtico, crean paisajes de
peligro urbanos por mas que el manejo de los desastres urbanos actue para reconfigurar las relaciones de
patron–cliente dentro de “estados-peligro”. El artıculo contribuye a un cuerpo emergente de literatura que analiza
los vınculos entre la gobernanza ambiental urbana, la autoridad estatal y la reproduccion de vulnerabilidad. Palabras
clave: America Latina, clientelismo, ecologıa polıtica, el estado, inundaciones urbanas, paisajes de peligro.
Relatively little analysis has taken place thatlinks clientelist forms of governance with theproduction of hazardous nature. Indeed, the
two issues seemingly grate when placed together:
Clientelism provokes imagery of an underhand
political exchange of favors, assumed in mainstream
politics to be swept aside as democratic rules of good
governance advance; nature, on the other hand,
engenders a sense of that outside human society—
heavy rainfall or a catastrophic flood that comes to
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disturb an established (urban) population. Both
concepts have been highly questioned in recent
political-ecological work on urban risk governance.
Despite clientelism involving practices related to
access and control of resources, and social natures
addressing the politics of state territorial power,
scholars in geography and related fields have been
slow to critically explore the linkages between state
power and production of environmental hazards and
vulnerabilities in neoliberal(izing) urban contexts.
In this article, we contribute to filling this gap by
drawing on our long-term research in urban areas
susceptible to serious floods and landslides in Brazil
and Mexico. Recent political-ecological research has
stressed the interrelationships between the production
of space, political positioning, and environmental vul-
nerability, and yet the modes through which the state
engages with inhabitants residing in hazardous envi-
ronments are rarely analyzed in detail. We argue that
an understanding of the production of hazardous
urban spaces and socially differentiated vulnerabilities
necessitates a focus on the intricacies and informal-
ities through which the state acts and manifests its
power. An analysis of shifting forms of state making
and clientelist networking helps to understand the
everyday encounters of the state and heterogeneous
groups of residents, who seek to negotiate their place
and reformulate their positionality within hazardous
living conditions and volatile politics in segregated
cities in the Global South.
We engage here with (urban) political ecologies
of hazards and vulnerability alongside those of the
state and clientelism. Critical-geographic research
has largely moved away from residualist notions of
clientelism—viewed as an unfortunate hangover of
paternalist rule—toward analyzing multifaceted con-
figurations of clientelist relationships within shifting
sociopolitical circumstances, including social segrega-
tion, gentrification, neoliberalizing governance, and
struggles for the right to the city (Gandy 2008; Roy
2009; Ghertner 2011; Hilgers 2011; Gupta 2012;
Harris 2012). Moreover, scholars focusing on the
ethnography of the state have analyzed the capillary
effects of state power and residents’ day-to-day nego-
tiations in formal and informal arenas of political
representation, based around shifting positionality
and differentiated understanding of how to play
brokers’ games (Das 2011; Auyero 2012; Meehan
2013; Caldeira 2015; Sletto and Nygren 2015). We
engage with these interpretations of everyday
politics, simultaneously arguing for a stronger focus
on broader scalar politics and on the manifold mate-
rialities within and through which these political
negotiations and contestations take place.
Urban flood hazards fit well with this concern for
environmental vulnerabilities alongside changing
modes of governance, and yet approaches to
environmental hazards have often interpreted vulner-
ability in terms of the incapability of the state to
mitigate risks and alleviate urban poverty (cf.
Maricato 2003; Pelling 2003; Collins 2009). Paying
scant attention to clientelist practices, or multiface-
ted negotiations between governmental, private sec-
tor, and civil-society actors, the tendency has been
to view clientelism normatively in the same bracket
as illegality, informality, and unruliness. In contrast,
we are interested in shifting forms of state making
and clientelism, and strategies of urban policy and
planning that lead to aggregated floods and land-
slides. Our study intersects with literature on hazard-
scapes, probing the role of clientelist governance and
technocratic knowledge in producing hazardous and
socially segregated urban environments (Scott 1998;
Mustafa 2005; Collins 2009), simultaneously illus-
trating how engagement with environmental hazards
reshapes clientelist relations and the role of the state
in environmental governance. To avoid claims of
institutionally coherent and monolithic state power,
we explore how multifaceted interventions aimed at
mitigating volatile natural forces are implemented
and contested through actual forms of clientelist
governing and political networking (Robbins 2008:
Harris 2017; Sud 2017). Given recent theoretical
interest in political ecologies of governance and
ethnographies of the state, our study contributes to
a developing literature linking disasters, state
power, neoliberal governance, and socioecological
interactions in hazardous urban environments
(Bakker 2012; Zeiderman 2012; Robertson 2015;
Swyngedouw 2015; Nygren 2018; Coates 2019).
We present here two cases—the city of Nova
Friburgo in Brazil and the city of Villahermosa in
Mexico—as representative landscapes to explore
wider interlinkages between urban governance, seri-
ous floods, and clientelist processes experienced
across much of Latin America and beyond. Despite
contextual variations, these two cases have in com-
mon the strategic implantation of urban modernity
into places highly susceptible to flood hazards. In
both cities, the economic growth of the last few
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decades has led to an increasingly unequal distribu-
tion of environmental hazards and state responses.
Whereas the poor remain most vulnerable to state-
led resettlements, infrastructural engineering is
delivered overwhelmingly for the wealthy. Through
careful analysis of these two cases, we show how the
(re)emergence of clientelist politics is linked to
broader intertwinements of repressive state making,
populist calls for sociospatial ordering, and neoliberal
forms of governance (McCarthy 2019).
In the next section, we discuss relevant literature
on hazards, clientelism, and the political ecology of
the state within the context of neoliberalizing gover-
nance, and with attention to the gaps identified for
theoretical contribution. We then explain our
empirical cases from Brazil and Mexico and the
methodologies used, before we analyze floods and
landslides as arenas of clientelist state making and
governance. Next we explain floods and landslides
as grounds where hazardscapes and hazardstates are
intertwined. We conclude by linking the political
ecology of hazards and vulnerabilities with the politi-
cal ecology of state making through clientel-
ist practices.
Theoretical Approaches to Hazards
and Clientelist Governance
Political ecology has for some time sought to
problematize the interrelationships between gover-
nance, state making, and management of hazardous
environments. By drawing on the idea of the state as
an effect of engaged policies and practices, including
construction of flood-protection infrastructures and
enforcement of human relocations, it has placed
emphasis on governance of “unruly” environments
and “undisciplined” people as an arena to legitimize
state authority (Harris 2012; Bridge 2014; Meehan
and Molden 2015; Swyngedouw 2015). In the fol-
lowing analysis, we contribute to this literature by
defetishizing the state as an established set of institu-
tions acting over nature. Instead, we show how the
production and control of nature—including the
socially differentiated distribution of environmental
benefits and burdens—is key to understanding state
making (Robertson 2015; Loftus 2018; Mullenite
2019). In our view, drastic transformations in water-
scapes produce complicated socioecological condi-
tions and unforeseen risks that promote new
justifications for repeated state interventions. These
socioecological linkages cast the state as both pro-
ducer and product of such engagements. The ability
to problematize certain environments and popula-
tions as requiring corrective interventions marks the
critical boundary work indicating which areas and
citizens are at the center of state interest (Zeiderman
2012; Harris 2017). Intensified contact with these
unruly areas consolidates state power and legitimizes
a particular sociospatial order, interweaving the very
notion of stateness with the governance of environ-
ments and populations considered hazardous and
undisciplined.
We take these dynamics of state making seriously
as we examine the role of clientelist practices in the
production and control of flood and landslide haz-
ardscapes in urban Latin America. Our contention is
that rather than a signifier of the state’s inability to
address the risks and vulnerabilities of hazardous
environments, clientelist engagements act as rela-
tional boundary markers, or techniques of gover-
nance (Foucault 2007) through which the state
consolidates its visible and concealed power vis-a-vis
volatile environments and unruly citizens. As Ioris
(2012) pointed out, the management of urban water
problems implicates socially differentiated service
delivery through which powerful groups negotiate
their position vis-a-vis service providers to assert
their privileges. Although the state presents itself as
acting cohesively for the environmental safety of all
citizens, an ethnographic analysis of hazard gover-
nance reveals a much more fragmented sociopolitical
fabric (Harris 2012; Hilgers 2012).
Clientelism, nonetheless, can appear nebulous as
a descriptor of political behavior, reciting conven-
tional cliches of an ungovernable South and ideal-
state North, which probably explains the limited
engagement of geographical-oriented scholarship
with the concept. Loosely defined around state offi-
cials’ providing small benefits to the poor in
exchange for political legitimacy, clientelism has
conventionally been perceived in opposition to equi-
table citizenship (Holston 2011). Viewed essentially
as a residue of authoritarianism, it has been thought
to wither away in progress from state paternalism to
liberal democracy (Fox 1994; Carvalho 1997).
Here we avoid such residualistic views, and
instead focus on the relations between environmen-
tal and institutional factors that reproduce the state
through clientelist interactions (Guarneros-Meza
2009; Sud 2017). We view these arrangements as
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ambiguous responses to shifting material and institu-
tional conditions, including modified interpretations
of what the state should represent politically and
economically under neoliberalizing governance
(Hilgers 2011; Bridge 2014). Moreover, whereas con-
ventional approaches view clientelism only as
authorities’ provision of favors to the marginalized,
we argue that it is constituted by exchanges of
diverse benefits and burdens among heterogeneous
actors, often in unequal encounters. Following
Harvey (2005), we consider clientelist processes
within neoliberalism as powerful, if highly selective,
modes of governmental intervention in favor of elite
politicians and capitalist markets. In recent institu-
tional changes toward public sector privatization,
where loosely coordinated authorities implement
market-based forms of urban planning, environmen-
tal regulation, service delivery, and flood prevention,
socially differentiated exposure to environmental
risks has augmented. Simultaneously, neoliberal dis-
courses of self-responsibilization urge the vulnerable
to take an active role in mitigating hazards through
individualized adaptation strategies (Nygren 2016).
River canalizations and containment walls protect
privileged neighborhoods from disastrous floods,
whereas the poor strive to survive in environmen-
tally hazardous and politically volatile circumstances.
We also assert the capacity of clientelism to act
as boundary marker in the state’s problematization of
environments and populations at risk, showing how
residents acquiesce to, reconfigure, and contest
patron–client relationships (Meehan 2014; Nygren
2018). This point is often missing from historical
analyses of clientelism that fall back on cultural
interpretations within a priori states. Nonetheless,
understanding historical trajectories is imperative.
Scholars of Latin American politics discuss clientel-
ism’s roots in colonial latifundia, labored over by
slaves and impoverished peasants within the global
production of sugar, coffee, minerals, and other com-
modities. As Hilgers (2011) pointed out, “in return
for access to needed resources, the peasant provided
labor, gifts, deference, shows of affection, and politi-
cal support to the patron, enhancing the latter’s sta-
tus” (570). Leal’s ([1949] 1986) haunting study of
multiscalar politics over colonial socioeconomic
order presented a landmark in understanding how
the modern state in Latin America emerged and
functions, by explaining the deceits and dependen-
cies characterizing the lives of those in the margins.
Plantation owners’ “nature blaming” discourses
enabled the use of environmental hazards to justify
paternalistic relationships and peasant subservience.
In numerous contexts, plantation owners marshaled
workers’ bodies, minds, and spirits to support their
own political-economic endeavors (Wolf and Mintz
1957; Scott 1972).
Recent scholarship on clientelism in Latin
America has largely focused on explaining the sur-
vival of clientelist networks through urbanizations
and third-wave democratizations following region-
wide developmentalist authoritarianism. The concept
of obrismo, widely used in Latin American studies,
refers to the games played by stakeholders attempting
to gain authority to implement an obra (infrastruc-
tural project), and to the power that public
officials and brokers wield in exchange for votes and
political support from the target groups. Diniz (1982)
explained clientelism as a political strategy of elite
competition, where multiple scales of governance and
vast urban constituencies are drawn together through
numerous promises of obras or services.
Seen from the clients’ side, Auyero and Swistun
(2009) and Hilgers (2011) emphasized reciprocal
processes of bargaining, in which patrons are not all-
powerful, but depend on shifting grounds of political
recognition by target groups, who can play a particu-
lar political candidate off against another in multi-
faceted negotiations (Holston 2011). Simultaneously,
tacit threats of violence and subtle insinuations
about withdrawal of benefits can reinforce existing
patron–client relationships, depending on the
exchange in question and whether more favorably
viewed patrons are accessible. Regardless of being
often oppressive, clientelist relations are the key
means through which people gain access to resources
and services, including public-sector jobs, education
bursaries, piped water, land for house building, and
levees against disastrous floods within hierarchical
institutional arrangements (Auyero 2012).
Although these ideas provide us with important
insights into the political dimensions of clientelism,
they still demand deeper analysis of cognate environ-
mental and sociospatial underpinnings. By focusing
on the delivery of services to marginalized groups
through routinized networks of “client-ship” over cit-
izenship (Taylor 2004)—or by favor rather than by
right—the emphasis has been on the (mal)function-
ing of institutional procedures and the political sub-
jectivities they engender. According to Shefner
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(2012), understanding the rise of informal political
and economic engagements requires detailed exami-
nation of the resources actors actually wield within
changing state capabilities under neoliberalizing gover-
nance. Shefner emphasizes the embeddedness of social
institutions and the need to avoid separating politics
from material and economic outcomes. Neoliberal dis-
courses of public sectors as corrupt, costly, and ineffi-
cient are closely linked to the uneven distribution of
access to resources and exposure to hazards across
urban populations. Neoliberalizing governance and
associated privatizations partly explain surges in more
arbitrary forms of urban brokerage.
Shefner’s (2012) analysis helps to problematize
“what is politics for” (41); that is, the fact that with-
out resources to allocate or bargain over, state insti-
tutions—or indeed the state itself—would cease to
exist. Moreover, clientelist state governance has a
salient, if shifting role also within multifaceted forms
of neoliberalizing governance. This notion urges us
toward comprehensive analyses of the actual impacts
of neoliberalization on state institutions and political
arrangements. For several scholars, the personalized
structures of power evident in clientelist networks
demonstrate repeated private control over the pub-
lic, and a mix of authoritarian legacies with hybrid
regimes of neoliberal governance (Collier 2009;
M€uller 2016; Nygren 2016). Examining urban gover-
nance in Mexico, Guarneros-Meza (2009) argued
that shifting forms of clientelism and neoliberaliza-
tion have both shaped and been contingent on
existing state particularities, especially during decen-
tralizations from federal to state and municipal
authorities. Civil society mobilizations across Latin
America have clamored for more inclusive local gov-
ernance, and yet “local bosses, state governors and
municipal presidents … perform as if they owned
their posts without being accountable to the state
congress, municipal council or to the general public”
(Guarneros-Meza 2009, 467). As campaigns to
weaken state interventions have dovetailed with
neoliberal strategies to stimulate economic effi-
ciency, instead of the reduced role of the state, the
state has, in essence, been reconfigured through neo-
liberal governance (Sud 2017). Tightened public–-
private partnerships in urban service provision of
water, sewage, education, health care, and flood
prevention have overridden participatory forms of
decision making and promoted hidden forms of cli-
entelist behavior. On the other hand, rapid changes
in urban service delivery have forced local elites to
increasingly compete over and horse-trade the loyal
bases of their political support (Lund 2016; Coates
and Garmany 2017).
These trends illustrate the critical role of clientelist
relations in current state making as it relates to ratio-
nalities of urban environmental risk protection and
social vulnerabilization. From construction of piped
water and drainage canals to flood-prevention levees
and containment walls, hazardous urban expansion
and risk-reduction strategies are mediated and imple-
mented through clientelist political relationships that
act as conduits and schemas for the legitimization of
state authority (Rodina and Harris 2016; Anand
2017; Kelly-Richards and Banister 2017; Mullenite
2019). Given intensified urbanization in Latin
America, as elsewhere in the Global South, state
power has become acutely connected to the “conduct
of conduct” of urban constituents (Foucault 2007,
193) via the management of a host of hazards in
densely populated urban spaces. Our work on socially
differentiated responses to urban floods and landslides
in Brazil and Mexico is testament to how such
engagements become central to the state as both an
idea and a practice. Governmental authorities pro-
mote their commissioning of flood infrastructures as
evidence of their quick response in the face of disaster
and their role as accountable civic protectors; yet
state accountability is mediated through clientelist
networks that reinforce urban environmental risks
that hazardous state policies have largely created.
Whether or not accountable protection is realized,
risk management acts as a crucial mechanism to con-
solidate state power.
Researching Clientelism
in Flood-Prone Cities
Our research, undertaken in Brazil and Mexico
between 2011 and 2018, fits into recent work
exploring the political-ecological dynamics of floods
and landslides in Latin America, the world’s most
urbanized region (World Bank 2019). Indeed, the
processes through which urbanization takes place has
become the central point of our enquiry given the
unevenly distributed efforts to shore up, manage, and
displace urban dwellers in continuing (peri)urban
expansion. Although interested in hazards and disas-
ters and how vulnerability to such phenomena accu-
mulates, we invert this more conventional focus
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through attending to the politics of hazardous spaces.
How do people come to live in the settlements that
become the front line of flood and landslide expo-
sure? How do residents and (nominally) state actors
engage with these neighborhoods and attempt to
deal with hazards? Through this emphasis on politi-
cal-ecological processes, we seek to unpack how the
formulation of state cohesiveness is achieved through
an engagement with material practice.
As political ecologists of urban disasters and the
state, we employ ethnographic methods to under-
stand contextual specificities surrounding people’s
uneven exposure to volatile natures; that is, latent
conflicts concerning inequalities in flood-risk gover-
nance, including who receives interventions and in
what form (Rademacher 2015). Participant observa-
tions and the sourcing of oral histories enable us to
examine the city as a process rather than completed
phenomenon, and to link everyday life to institu-
tional governance across multiple scales. We are also
interested in exploring the biophysical circumstances
of urban spaces to understand “the multiple social
and natural interactions upon which [socioenviron-
mental problems] are grounded” (Little 2007, 89).
This requires a multi-actor approach to understand
the connections between poorer and wealthier social
groups, as well as with intervening governmental,
private, and civil-society actors. Each group’s claims
are triangulated and cross-checked through inter-
views, participant observation, historical memoriza-
tion, and exploration of biophysical conditions. In a
certain way these ethnographic extensions are analo-
gous—or add extra dimensions—to Burawoy’s (2009)
extended case methodology. Taking seriously the
idea that local politics and ecologies are in no way
autonomous and that sociospatial scales are not
inherent, we amplify the boundaries of the ethno-
graphic cases to highlight multiscalar links between
local environmental managers and higher level insti-
tutions in the production of socially differentiated
resource distribution, cultural recognition, and politi-
cal representation (Robertson 2015; Nygren 2018).
Although flood and landslide catastrophes have
directed us to these particular study sites, our pri-
mary concern is the largely invisible, overshadowed
existence of urban hazards. The first author’s field
research in Nova Friburgo, a city of 170,000 people,
130 km inland of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, focused on
the aftermath of one such disaster in 2011, in which
approximately 1,000 people lost their lives across the
region. This notwithstanding, floods have been
endemic to Nova Friburgo since it was founded in
1819, an effort to implant colonial modernity into
the “barbarous” indigenous territory of untamed
Atlantic Forest (Coates 2019). Burgeoning from a few
hundred European settlers and Afro-Brazilian slaves at
the outset, due to industrialization in the 1920s and
1930s, this site grew to a city of some 70,000 inhabi-
tants by 1960. Developmentalist expansion under the
military dictatorship (1964–1985), alongside a dra-
matic decline in coffee exports, fed urban growth
along a narrow valley wetland and onto mountain-
sides. A similar history is common to many urban
agglomerations within the 2,000-km-long mountains
of the Serra do Mar, with each rainy season bringing
destruction of abodes of poor residents under torrents
of rain and slides of mud, as inundated valley floors
paralyze life and livelihood along the river margins.
The catastrophization of natural disaster risk serves
state making through its repression of narratives of
causation in capitalist urbanization and the everyday
political-ecological realities of hazardous urban mar-
gins, simultaneously enabling the mobilization of
claims to authoritative state scientific expertise
(Valencio 2014; Arefin 2019).
The research in Nova Friburgo is primarily based
on two mixed-class areas in the city’s industrial north,
Conselheiro Paulino and Corrego D’Antas, both hit
hard in the 2011 disaster. In the former, we focus on
poorer residents along the river margin, many of
whom were evicted for river canalization, whereas in
the latter we discuss residents who returned to con-
demned housing after failing to gain landslide con-
tainment infrastructure. These cases are juxtaposed
with two more affluent neighborhoods that quickly
gained risk-prevention infrastructures to avoid resi-
dent displacement. The first author undertook signifi-
cant field work in Nova Friburgo in 2013 and 2014,
with follow-up visits in 2017 and 2018. Ethnographic
work consisted of participant observations with resi-
dents, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and
state agencies, including public and council meetings.
Eighty open-ended interviews, sometimes with walk-
or drive-arounds, focused on local residents, civil
defense, and other municipal officials, and further dis-
cussions took place with local historians, and employ-
ees of state and federal government, the United
Nations, and the World Bank.
The second author carried out ethnographic
research in Villahermosa, a city of 1 million
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inhabitants, located in the floodplains of the State of
Tabasco, southeastern Mexico, during several rounds
of field work between 2011 and 2018. The research
focused on the uneven distribution of flood hazards
and disasters in this socially segregated, but inherently
interconnected city. The oil boom in the 1980s led
to Villahermosa’s rapid growth, with large numbers of
migrants seeking industry or service sector employ-
ment. Land prices simultaneously skyrocketed due to
speculation linked to dizzying economic growth. Due
to its location near the Gulf of Mexico, on wetlands
just above sea level and at the confluence of some of
Mexico’s most capricious rivers, Villahermosa is
exposed to extreme hydro-meteorological events.
Given 31 percent of Mexican freshwater sources are
located in Tabasco (Garcıa Garcıa 2013), and that
the region is also a key area for oil and natural gas
extraction, the challenges related to flood governance
are extraordinarily high.
Serious floods have been recorded in
Villahermosa since the early 1800s. In 2007, 62 per-
cent of the city was inundated during exceptional
devastation—in several places flooding up to four
meters above street level—and since then there
have been serious floods almost annually. The sec-
ond author carried out eighty semistructured, open-
ended interviews with residents in four sectors of the
city, including the high-income residential area of
Tabasco 2000; a middle-income neighborhood, El
Guayabal; a low-income, working-class neighbor-
hood, Gaviotas Sur; and an informal settlement
called Casa Blanca. Informants were selected consid-
ering their living conditions, age, gender, social posi-
tion, political power, and length of residence.
Interviews focused on residents’ experiences of disas-
ters and everyday vulnerabilities, and on their views
of flood governance and provision of services.
Special attention was paid to informal residents’
forced relocations from the city center to an urban
periphery, and residents’ views of the state’s ambigu-
ous intrusion and absence in their lives. This work
was complemented by seventy interviews with multi-
level governmental authorities, policymakers, urban
planners, flood-risk consultants, journalists, academ-
ics, and representatives of NGOs and socioenviron-
mental movements in Villahermosa. The second
author also organized policy dialogue workshops
between government, private, and NGO sectors with
a focus on water governance, and associated risks
and vulnerabilities.
Informal conversations on environmental vulner-
abilities and governance were crucial to understand
people’s experiences of changing hazardscapes and
quotidian realities in both case studies. Participant
observation was especially helpful in understanding
contextual shifts in people’s views of governance and
explanations of socially differentiated vulnerabilities,
and the negotiations and networks involved. Interview
and participant observation data were complemented
by analyses of policy documents, development reports,
environmental and social impact assessments, and
plans for flood-management infrastructure and territo-
rial ordering. Archival documents and media reports
further helped us in understanding change through
the two cities’ socioenvironmental histories.
By focusing on these sites in Brazil and Mexico,
our analysis seeks to illustrate the political-ecological
and sociospatial complexities that characterize peo-
ple’s efforts to live, or muddle along, within shifting
hazardscapes and hazardstates in socially segregated
cities. In line with political ecology, we propose
actors’ multifaceted claims to a safe living environ-
ment and inclusive governance and the efforts of
those vulnerable to hazards to achieve their right to
the city.
Clientelist Governance
A key trope of conventional work on clientelism
concerns its informal nature, in contrast to the legit-
imate processes of a formal state. This teleology plays
out socially and spatially, as “backward” sociopoliti-
cal organization is supposed to be modernized
through urbanization. Instead, here we demonstrate
how the state itself acts informally by reproducing its
power through clientelist networks. We show how
the very effort to modernize—through urbanization
and neoliberalization—extends hazardscapes that
require a deepening of clientelist governance. A
modified state thrives on the development of hazard-
ous urban space and operates through clientelist net-
works that ensure continued differentiation in
vulnerability and hazard exposure.
Nova Friburgo’s development in recent decades is
a case in point. Geraldo, an elderly man living alone
along the riverbank in the midst of Conselheiro
Paulino’s industrial zone, was facing eviction and
demolition of his house to accommodate river canal
engineering following the 2011 disaster. He declared
with incredulity:
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Back then, in the 1980s [then mayor] Herodoto came
to this house and danced on our veranda; he gave a
lecture to win our votes … And when I went to
legalize my little house here in that era, it cost me
something like 8,000 reais [R$].
Like those in some 800 households along the river-
bank, Geraldo’s anger was underpinned by a sense of
powerlessness following the spray-painting of a red
“X” on his front wall, indicating forthcoming demo-
lition at an unknown date. Another resident,
Julia, affirmed:
People have lived close to the river for sixty years, but
the government’s eyes were closed throughout,
permitting them to live there. We say to them, “How
can the municipality charge me IPTU [local
government tax] if I live in an irregular area?” And
now they come and say “You can’t live in a risk area;
this area can’t be inhabited.” It’s easy, no? These
evictions are incoherent … ! Now there’ll be a
housing deficit of 10,000 or 15,000.
The two residents’ stories are indicative of hazardous
urban expansion that accelerated in the 1980s and
1990s in Nova Friburgo. After 2011, the drive for
risk management infrastructure led to evictions, con-
troversial resettlements at the city’s fringes, and deep
distrust in political processes across many affected
neighborhoods. Whereas politicians and scientists
focused on the external quantities of rainfall and
river flow—and what should be done to the margin-
alized in their wake—residents themselves were well
aware of the contradictions of state governance that
had aided and abetted their settlement in dangerous
locations and ultimately caused what was then
labeled a “natural” disaster.
Since the early 1960s, municipal politics in Nova
Friburgo had been dominated by a feud between
Herodoto—who “danced” for Geraldo’s vote to
become mayor in the mid-1980s—and two generations
of the Azevedo family. As a road engineer, Herodoto
represented the national-developmentalist dreams of
Brazil’s military dictatorship (1964–1985), and was
instrumental in long-standing policies to beautify the
city and relocate the unsightly settlements of the poor
from the center to mountainsides and wetlands at the
fringes. Whereas his core support lay amidst the mid-
dle class, the populist Azevedos drew their base from
among the workers, and occupied a series of key
municipal positions during and after the dictatorship.
In interview, Araujo, local historian and academic,
compared these two figures’ violent rivalry to the days
of coronelismo from the Old Republic (1889–1930),
when strong landowners competed for power over the
state by marshaling supporters’ votes.
In Nova Friburgo, key devotees have frequently
been paid in cash to gain new constituents through
promises, bribes, and threats, and to upset opposition
areas. Those who achieved were rewarded, together
with their relatives, with municipal cargos (jobs), pri-
ority in service delivery, and other favors like prefer-
ential schooling and health care. The younger
Azevedo, Paulinho, gained local notoriety in the
early 1970s when he shot an opponent of his uncle,
the older Amancio, at point-blank range in Nova
Friburgo’s council chamber—a murder for which he
escaped significant jail time. Ever charismatic,
Paulinho later served twice as mayor, as opposition
leader against Herodoto, and as the patriarch in
whose name other straw prefects and councilors
acted. Paulinho died in the 2011 disaster, but is
fondly remembered across the city’s factory-worker
class for his personal touch—he spoke of constitu-
ents as “my darling children”—and his reliability in
following through on promises and favors.
The significance of the Herodoto–Paulinho story
goes beyond a supposed cultural and political inher-
itance of clientelism from an older personalistic
order. Although colonial legacies and republic-era
state making bear relevance, politicians’ power
bases were reformulated through and over socioen-
vironmental changes inherent to urbanization.
Local politicians fought over decades to (re)settle
and legalize informal residents to build power bases
that could take control of the delivery (or conces-
sion delivery) of services, alongside the associated
rewards of public and private power. Most of this
urban expansion was illegal according to the
Federal Forest Code, which was designed precisely
to prevent erosion on steep inclines and along river
margins (Ministerio do Meia Ambiente [MMA]
2011). As a federal environmental regulator opera-
tive in Nova Friburgo advised:
To have fiscalizac¸~ao [planning compliance] in the
municipality, there are political questions and private
interests … Fiscalizac¸~ao generates such a headache,
even for a diligent mayor—a headache that loses
votes—so he prefers to withdraw entirely or delegate
responsibility elsewhere.
Corresponding clientelist politics over hazardscapes
are evident in urban policy and planning in
Villahermosa, Mexico. Like in Nova Friburgo,
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clientelism acts here as a crucial way to grant small
favors and allocate slender amenities to the poor to
garner their votes, and scant attention is paid to
long-term vulnerabilities. In clientelist networks
managed through persuasion, manipulation, and
coercion, the poor are expected to maintain humility
to allow bureaucrats to act as beneficial patrons.
Mauricio, an ambulant trader working in a stall near
the market of Pino Suarez in Casa Blanca, noted:
The government gives you something to eat, so that
you’re content; they give you small presents so that
you don’t start to protest. … Local political leaders
invite you to this and that meeting and give you small
privileges … to make sure that you vote for a certain
candidate. … They control politics by generating
obras and services, and by facilitating access to upper
level authorities.
The engagement in clientelist networks requires
much flexibility on the part of the poor, as tactics of
manipulation and humiliation require them to spend
considerable time appealing for basic amenities, fil-
ing small petitions, and waiting to be attended.
Many people in poor neighborhoods of Gaviotas Sur
and Casa Blanca in Villahermosa lamented how offi-
cials repeatedly put them through the ringer: post-
poning agreed appointments, asking them to come
in then failing to attend, selectively revealing and
hiding information, and requesting extended waits
and thereafter claiming that another institution is
responsible. Residents expressed mistrust over
whether officials’ promises would be fulfilled, or
whether they would ever gain something from the
petitions in question. Anxiety and shame were also
prevalent, resulting from missing an opportunity to
gain critical resources from elsewhere or from being
ignored. While weakening people’s confidence in
state institutes, clientelist procedures reinforce
authorities’ power, helping them to maintain a polit-
ical clientele at their service and demonstrating the
supremacy of the state to set the rules (Auyero
2012; Wiesel and Freestone 2019).
There are two interrelated mechanisms here in the
clientelist allocation of resources and governance of
urban environmental hazards in Villahermosa, Nova
Friburgo, and in many other Latin American cities.
First, the state actively intervenes in poor people’s
lives and livelihoods in the form of strict control and
surveillance. Second, it is simultaneously absent
through its institutional inability and unwillingness to
provide adequate water, sanitation, security, and
flood-prevention infrastructures in impoverished set-
tlements. These two sides of governance—tight super-
vision interlinked with institutional intrusion—situate
the poor at the intersection of multiple marginaliza-
tions, while reinforcing state power (Nygren and
Wayessa 2018). This conjuncture of institutional pres-
ence and absence leaves the poor on the shadows of
informality, while hiding state responsibility for secur-
ing a safe living environment for all citizens.
Residents’ feelings of coercion and abandonment are
further enforced by institutional misrecognition that
invokes humiliating discourses about who has the
right to which parts of the city.
At the same time, our ethnographic analyses dem-
onstrate the reach of clientelism beyond granting
small favors to the impoverished, toward incorporat-
ing powerful elites and big business. The intersection
of authorities’ practices with the loci of social posi-
tion and political power regulates residents’ opportu-
nities to symbolic power and social status, through
their ability to access goods, and at which speed.
Although conventional analyses of governance often
assume a clear distinction between public and per-
sonal interests, in everyday politics these lines are
blurred, especially in circumstances where people’s
loyalties and reputations are tied to political net-
works (Gandy 2008; Gupta 2012). In Villahermosa
and Nova Friburgo, upper, middle, and lower class
residents all pointed out that engaging with the state
apparatus through official channels yields few results,
and thus access to resources must be approached
through patronage and political connection. In these
vernacular webs of influence, the state as a formal
set of institutional procedures becomes mixed with a
range of informal and concealed arenas. Officials
provide inside information on tenders and areas to
be developed for particular businesses, even as they
turn a blind eye to questionable land appropriations,
grant permission for illegal construction in high-risk
areas, and allocate favorable contracts and personal
benefits for certain companies in exchange for politi-
cal loyalty. As most bureaucratic positions are politi-
cally volatile, officials need their authority to be
continuously recognized through rewards and favors
to privileged sectors (Lund 2016).
As Balls and Fischer (2019, 466) noted, access to
water, electricity, and other services has strong polit-
ical significance as a marker of inclusion within gov-
ernmental development projects. It also crucially
resonates with physical and symbolic presence or
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absence of the state in residents’ everyday lives.
Haphazard urban development and socially differen-
tiated service delivery in Villahermosa have strong
links to institutional structures driven by powerful
political and personal interests that constrain more
equitable resource distribution. Governmental cen-
suses indicating water supply coverage of 95 percent,
even in the poorest neighborhoods in Villahermosa,
hide its quality and regularity. Piped water is inter-
mittent in Gaviotas Sur and Casa Blanca, as politi-
cally instituted power cuts at peak times concentrate
there: At times, women wait for hours to get enough
water for washing, whereas at others the water
emerges under so much pressure that it is mixed
with mud. In contrast, affluent residents have effi-
cient systems of water storage and filtration, and
concealed ways to “milk” the authorities. As Roy, an
influential entrepreneur living in the elite neighbor-
hood of Tabasco 2000, stated:
We have mechanisms for making demands of the
authorities. If I pay taxes, how can it be that they
don’t serve me? … Just a couple of telephone calls,
and the problems get solved.
Our point here is that rather than representing a leg-
acy of earlier authoritarianism, clientelist relation-
ships are modified and reproduced according to
surrounding political, economic, and environmental
circumstances. In recent decades, clientelism in Latin
America has been altered through overlapping decen-
tralization and neoliberalization. Decentralization was
a key transition policy across Latin America in the
1980s and 1990s, uniting constitutionalists’ demands
for local accountability alongside national elites’ and
foreign investors’ pushes for urban competitiveness,
including service privatization (Guarneros-Meza
2009). As such, urban planning and provision of
water, sanitation, and other basic services became
increasingly municipal concerns across much of Latin
America, while simultaneous neoliberalization
demanded strategic public–private partnerships for
improved efficiency. Yet many municipalities—very
often viewed by mayors as personal fiefdoms—lacked
the technical capability or willingness to negotiate
growing demands for homes and urban services,
which raised the risk of environmental disaster. This
translated into an increased focus on environmental
problems, as political leaders and their strawmen
competed for lucrative votes by enabling new settle-
ments within risk zones and turning a blind eye to
the actions of friendly developers of illicit real estate
(Coates and Garmany 2017). Hazardous urban
peripheries, along riverbanks, floodplains, and steep
slopes, were gradually legalized, displaced further out,
and legalized again.
These processes reaffirmed the state as allocator of
resources and basic services, at the same time
demanding its stronger hand in disaster mitigation.
Sud (2017) discussed this “rescaled spatiality of the
state” (76), in which urban development becomes
an arena of networked governance, where nominal
formal–informal divisions wither away alongside the
overarching drive for neoliberal growth. Local elites
are well positioned to take advantage of a rescaled,
neoliberalizing state, as they have opportunities to
establish clientelist networks with new subcontracted
intermediary developers and brokers. Furthermore, as
shifting forms of governance interact with elevated
risk of torrents of water, mud, and debris, the politics
of designing “sustainable” cities becomes increasingly
socioenvironmental in nature (Coates 2019).
Certain residents are repeatedly evicted and reset-
tled, which provides legitimation for selective con-
trol by the state while reproducing the vulnerable
settlement–disaster–vulnerable resettlement cycle
again and again (Rodina and Harris 2016).
The Interplay of Hazardscapes
and Hazardstates
In our view, hazardscapes and hazardstates are
intrinsically coproduced and comodified through
urban policy and planning in Nova Friburgo,
Villahermosa, and other environmentally fragile and
socially vulnerable cities in the Global South. In the
literature on hazardscapes, the relationship between
state power and the production of hazards has
received scant attention, and literature on the formu-
lation of clientelist governance has largely ignored
the significance of environmental hazards (Mustafa
2005; Collins 2009; Saguin 2017). We argue that
floods and landslides, as powerful and to a degree
unpredictable biophysical forces, need serious consid-
eration in understanding the shaping of governance,
and governance in turn mediates the causes and con-
sequences of devastating floods and landslides.
For several decades, the achievement of services
and infrastructures through clientelistic obrismo was
assumed to be a mode of governance within prevail-
ing state apparatuses in Latin America. We show
here that engagement in clientelist networks
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surrounding such infrastructure delivery is part and
parcel of weaving the idea of stateness through
urban material. Defetishizing the state requires an
understanding of the construction of urban hazard-
scapes that simultaneously calls forth “responsible”
institutional governance.
In Nova Friburgo, a desire for ideal-state delivery
of flood and landslide engineering was contradicted
by the awareness of the everyday reality of clientel-
ism. As a state-level geologist asserted, when com-
menting on infrastructural obras, “We provide all the
technical data, but the selection of sites for contain-
ment we have no control over.” Across the city, a
number of sites were quickly approved for contain-
ment in places that suffered no deaths in 2011, over
other locations with many fatalities. This was most
obvious near the Prac¸a Paissandu, an affluent area
that experienced a landslide with property damage
but no injuries. The expensive containment wall
there was one of the first, and known by most to
have been completed through residents’ effective
pulling of political strings. Similarly, at Duas Pedras,
a lower middle- and working-class neighborhood
between the center and Conselheiro Paulino, the
containment of some 100 meters of hillside pro-
tected no one except a former politician whose large
house and swimming pool occupied the hilltop
above. For much of the city, these and other deci-
sions really grated, given their often life-and-death
implications.
Containment delivery for elites contradicted
strongly the situation in Corrego D’Antas, a large
valley neighborhood to the northwest of the city
that had felt the full magnitude of the disaster with
numerous casualties. A mixed-class district, contain-
ment obras were built there to repair the immediate
riverbanks and to strengthen loose boulders on the
mountainside high above. Immediately north of the
river, however, where the poorest housing is located,
the promised containment never materialized.
Numerous residents were removed here, and people
felt much anger that in all cases they had paid
municipal taxes and supported local councilors.
Plans for a riverine park with community facilities
and for containment on the northern hillside were
presented on paper, but these public works were
never started. Many residents returned to their con-
demned properties, balancing the risk of landslide
with the discomfort of living a long way from their
workplace and feeling abandoned. As Gabriela, a
local resident elaborated, “People were simply left to
reinhabit a landslide site … . [They returned] even
knowing the position of risk that they are in.”
Clientelist negotiation related to reinhabitation was
the means by which marginal populations sought
their right to the city—as much as it had been the
process enabling them to build their homes in a haz-
ardous place at the outset.
The Estrada da Girasol road links Corrego
D’Antas to another neighborhood, California. To
the eastern side of the road, below a 2011 landslide
site, evident deforestation took place in 2017 and a
new low-income housing subdivision was being
marked out on the ground. According to Jo~ao, this
peri-urban expansion was unregulated according to
federal legislation but effectively encouraged by the
municipality. Gabriela explained how this kind of
development was possible:
It’s about who has friends in the right department,
someone who can expedite a process; to make
sometimes what is not correct to become correct. …
The fact that our ex-mayor is now in charge of
[environmental monitoring] is incoherent, because he
owes favors to certain people, so he’s likely to allow
certain construction projects. I don’t want to give
details but I find it reckless. Principally with
subdivisions, it just gets worse with him inside and a
new cycle [of disaster] begins.
The residents were resigned to skepticism over
whether this situation would ever improve. The new
subdivision—which produced yet another new haz-
ardous landscape—was the likely result of a clientel-
ist compromise between the ex-mayor, a local
councilor or service provider for the neighborhood
to whom the ex-mayor was indebted, and the land
developer himself. In his new post as environmental
chief, the ex-mayor could both repay existing debts
and do favors for new associates by turning a blind
eye to responsible land management, knowing that
markets for needed votes and services would ensue.
If landslide risk ever received consideration, he
knew that long-term responsibility would never fall
his way. The overarching push for urban develop-
ment, mediated through clientelism, produced a
potential new disaster, just as state power was itself
consolidated through this process of horse-trading
new markets for urban environmental security, serv-
ices, and votes.
Similar conditions where socially differentiated
governance produces hazardous landscapes and vice
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versa are prevalent in Villahermosa. Powerful politi-
cal-economic interests have reinforced technocratic
approaches to flood management in Tabasco for sev-
eral decades, including construction of massive flood-
walls, embankments, and water-diversion channels.
Under the increasing threat of future disaster, how-
ever, consultants and government officials are now
stressing the social disciplining of “environmentally
unruly” residents in addition to infrastructural meas-
ures (Nygren 2016). Intensive awareness-raising pro-
grams, led by governmental institutes and NGOs, are
based on the view that floods are caused by a cultural
deficit of order among the poor, leading to them
dropping garbage and choking the drains. The
implicit idea is that informal residents are culpable for
heightened flood risk and should transform them-
selves into responsible citizens. At the same time,
scant attention is paid to illegal dumping and dis-
charge of untreated wastewater by industry, alongside
speculative landfills, and land appropriations in other
parts of the city, with multifaceted links to devastat-
ing floods.
We also emphasize that although governments use
flood-risk prevention agendas for their political con-
venience, volatile natural forces, such as floods and
landslides, are difficult to control and “discipline.”
People’s increased exposure to hazards in
Villahermosa and Nova Friburgo is strongly linked
to long-term governmental missions to master
“volatile nature” and manipulate the biophysical
phenomena of river courses and water flows. For dec-
ades, respective governments have invested in costly
hydraulic infrastructures to modify river courses,
with significant changes in hydrological regimes.
When traversing either city, river courses have been
canalized into narrow channels that allow minimal
room for the river to grow during heavy rain. In
Nova Friburgo, muddy runoff from degraded moun-
tainsides increases river sedimentation and causes
heightened flood risk that can only be mitigated
by frequent, costly drainage, which also tends to
be delivered through clientelist channels. In
Villahermosa, the technocratic vision to “fix the riv-
ers” ignores deltaic rivers’ frequent changes of course,
as well as the biophysical processes of rapid sedimen-
tation and riverbank erosion. There are several cases
where floodwalls have broken during heavy rain. This
has led to catastrophic consequences, with meters of
water inundating certain neighborhoods for several
days. In interviews, residents of Villahermosa
emphasized the difficulty in “domesticating” the furi-
ous hazardscapes of capricious rivers. Residents of
Gaviotas Sur who lived through devastating floods
made clear that rivers “always search their course,”
and “if controlled too much, will take revenge.”
Simultaneously, increased flood risk in
Villahermosa is linked to socially differentiated flood
governance strategies. After the 1999 flood, new
embankments were built along the right margin of
the Grijalva River where elite neighborhoods are
located, whereas the left margin was left unpro-
tected. Inevitably, in 2007 the unprotected left mar-
gin flooded, and the government began carrying out
forceful displacements from Gaviotas Sur and Casa
Blanca in the name of environmental safety for the
entire city. Residents unwilling to leave were forcibly
removed, and their houses bulldozed to prevent
return. Ironically, powerful local politicians had per-
suaded the poor to settle in these areas a few decades
earlier to canvas voter support. Meanwhile, policy
documents emphasized that the 2007 disaster was
caused by extreme hydrometeorological conditions
that would worsen with future climate change, thus
ignoring the role of institutional politics in shaping
the causes and consequences of flooding and the
intimate interconnections between environmental
and political causes of vulnerability.
Operations to relocate informal settlers from
Villahermosa’s center to the periphery have close
links to land speculation and city beautification,
whereby the state advances the interests of upper
classes and private investors to make the center eco-
nomically and socially more attractive. Since 2009,
some 35,000 people living along the riverbanks have
been relocated to new, highly compact peri-urban
resettlement sites. One of these was paternalistically
named Gracias Mexico (Thanks Mexico), as, accord-
ing to authorities, beneficiaries should demonstrate
gratitude to the government. At the same time,
affluent neighborhoods, commercial centers, and
industrial facilities were built in equally risky areas
enabled by massive flood protection infrastructure.
The institutional categorizations of legal settlement
and illegal encroachment, and risky and safe living
environments, depend fundamentally on the social
position of people living in a given area.
Beyond authorities’ assurances that relocations
were necessary to protect the city from future disas-
ter, soon after the expropriation, semihidden plan-
ning agendas emerged for real estate redevelopment
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in Casa Blanca. These plans link displacements to
investment opportunities for land speculators and
construction companies in areas officially classified
as risk zones. These agendas are strengthened with
essentialist discourses separating “proper citizens”
with rights to the city from those conceived of as
“illegal invaders” to be relocated. Although millions
of people in different Latin American, Asian, and
African cities have been displaced in recent years,
scant attention is paid to links between hazard gov-
ernance, consolidation of state power, and the pro-
duction of socially differentiated urban agglomerates
(Ghertner 2011; Amoako 2016; Janoschka and
Sequera 2016). Institutional politics in Villahermosa,
Nova Friburgo, and other socially segregated cities in
the Global South enforce what is considered eco-
nomically profitable and socially prestigious in key
areas, relocating impoverished people to the margins
of state responsibility.
Through our ethnographic analyses of everyday
forms of governance, we want to avoid an essential-
ist view of clientelism as an inherently cultural phe-
nomenon, as well as the idea that we have a
privileged knowledge of “good” governance. Rather,
we argue, like Smith (2014), that clientelism is “a
socially produced, historically explainable phenom-
enon” (790), and a crucial mechanism through
which the state manifests itself. On this basis, we
call for political-ecological and urban-geographic
approaches that link the micropolitics of clientelist
manipulation to larger scale regimes of socially dif-
ferentiated governance and political favoritism, to
understand how paternalistic networks shape people’s
tactics of acquiescence, negotiation, and contestation
across time and scale. As Li (2018) laudably noted,
clientelism is not just a form of acting by corrupt
individuals or particular companies that do not obey
the law. It is “an extended, densely networked sys-
tem in which everyone must participate in order to
get something, or simply to survive” (329). It is a
style of socially differentiated governance of environ-
ments and people, and socially differentiating alloca-
tion of rights and responsibilities.
This perspective also helps to explain why the
poor, although criticizing the system, simultaneously
seek clientelist networks to advance their social
reproduction. During our interviews, marginal resi-
dents argued for more transparent governance, at the
same time identifying their underprivilege as a result
of disproportionate allocation of strategic resources
within clientelist networks. People repeatedly voted
for politicians they knew to be corrupt, and followed
leaders engaging in a politics that ultimately acted
against their interests. These contradictions need to
be understood in relation to constrained living con-
ditions and social positions within wider regimes of
governance and political economy. As an
entrenched and yet always modifying system, clien-
telism leaves few other options for the poor than to
voice their concerns through paternalistic channels,
making it difficult to overcome (Lukes 2011; Smith
2014; Balls and Fischer 2019). One explanation for
this reproduction is in politicians’ skillful manipula-
tion of people’s feelings for particular political pur-
poses: Their discourses of negligence and need of
care sensitively resonate with residents’ everyday
experiences (Smith 2014, 795).
At the same time, subtle forms of threat, bribery,
and punishment make people confused and timid to
act otherwise. Although residents of Villahermosa
engaged in heated discussions on corruption and cli-
entelism, and circulated rumors surrounding fraudu-
lent officials’ latest deals, participation in overt
political actions was risky due to state-induced
oppression. As Tabasco is one of Mexico’s most
important oil extraction regions, the government
often forcefully terminates open protests. At other
times, authorities purposely tolerate counteractions
because demonstrations that do not receive much
reaction from government tend to recede quicker
from public attention. These mechanisms lead peo-
ple to question prevailing forms of governance
mainly through everyday forms of resistance. Many
residents in Gaviotas Sur and Casa Blanca regular-
ized their land occupations by filling their plots with
mud and waste to show authorities that they are liv-
ing within flood-risk limits. Likewise, they renovate
their rustic huts with concrete and corrugated iron
to demonstrate that they are built according to flood
mitigation guidelines. People also regularize their
lives by developing diverse systems of informal water,
electricity, and waste services.
Nevertheless, instead of being simply improvised
“weapons of the weak,” these tactics have close links
to wider scale patterns of clientelist governance and
unequal resource distribution. Although authorities
denounce informal water and electricity connections
as illegal, in everyday politics they tacitly overlook
or support them (Meehan 2013). Considering the
innumerable illegal electricity wires hanging across
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poorer districts in Villahermosa, Nova Friburgo, and
numerous other Latin American cities, and the col-
lective efforts required for their maintenance, these
networks are far from clandestine. The issue is more
that authorities are unwilling to dismantle them, as
denying people access to water or electricity is politi-
cally risky. Through such politics, the poor are left
at the mercy of unreliable, informal options, with
the burden of self-help, and with unpredictable peti-
tions from political leaders. As Marta, resettled in
the peri-urban settlement of Bicentenario after evic-
tion from Villahermosa’s center, noted:
My house was near the riverbank. They threatened us
to leave … they intimidated us as if we were animals,
as if we’re worth nothing. People who have more
power could stay; the government doesn’t meddle with
them. … The leaders give us water just for one hour
in the morning and another in the evening. And there
is much corruption. One leader took four houses
during the resettlement and thereafter sold them.
When people criticized, he just said: “It’s not bad to
try to go forward.”
A central point here is that the politics of vulnerabi-
lization manifest themselves through creation of haz-
ardous landscapes, a conjunct of capital-intensive
development and unevenly distributed services and
flood-prevention infrastructures. Beyond the limited
options available to poor residents, intensifying haz-
ardscapes are riddled with clientelist forms of gov-
erning. This indicates that hazardstates create
hazardous landscapes, and these hazardscapes rein-
force the hazardousness of the state apparatus, via
clientelist governance. On this basis, urban hazards
and disasters can only be understood through analy-
sis of political-ecological processes that produce vul-
nerable populations within hazardous environments
alongside the very state institutions that act over
and through them.
Conclusion
This study has analyzed how socially differentiated
hazards and vulnerabilities are produced and rein-
forced through clientelist governance characterized
by selective institutional intrusion and absence in
segregated cities in Latin America. Recent work in
political ecology and critical geography has sought to
defetishize the state as a coherent entity, by examin-
ing state making as an ongoing process involving
multiple actors and multiple interests. Our study,
drawing on ethnographic analysis of Nova Friburgo
in Brazil and Villahermosa in Mexico, contributes to
these theoretical discussions, by showing how cur-
rent state making relies on remodified forms of cli-
entelist governance within neoliberalizing urban
environments. Characteristic of these forms of gover-
nance is strategic control and ignorance of environ-
ments and populations inhabiting risk-prone areas
through authoritarian state surveillance intertwined
with neoliberal outsourcing and deregulation
(McCarthy 2019).
By analyzing clientelism as an arena and a means
through which the state manifests itself in relation
to urban hazards, we reveal the mutually reinforcing
production of hazardscapes and hazardstates. The
study shows how state making and clientelist gover-
nance, including multifaceted forms of political
favoritism, create urban hazardscapes, as much as the
management of urban disasters motivates new con-
figurations of clientelist governance within contem-
porary hazardstates (Arefin 2019). Hazardscapes thus
imbricate with hazardstates on the basis of clientelist
relationships that determine the uneven exposure to
environmental hazards and unequal experiences of
state making across social groups.
To understand socially differentiated and social
differentiating urban governance requires analysis
that interconnects uneven distribution of environ-
mental benefits and burdens to institutional frames
of (mis)recognition and authorities’ categorization of
marginalized residents as intrusive others. It also
requires consideration of residents’ differentiated
opportunities to take part in political decision mak-
ing. In our analysis of the cities of Nova Friburgo
and Villahermosa, we have shown how the poor
request governance that would allow them a greater
say in the decisions that affect their lives, and a
state that is more oriented toward equal citizenship.
Prevalent politics, however, leaves few opportunities
for the vulnerable to get their claims recognized in
hierarchical channels of political representation and
social segregation.
The association of clientelist politics with urban
environmental hazards breaks with traditional views
of clientelism as the informal bargaining behavior of
the poor. Rather, neoliberal urban governance has
granted new impetus to clientelist relationships, as
stakeholders with different degrees of authority and
power negotiate and trade off problems related to haz-
ards and vulnerability in multifaceted arenas, where
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formal, informal, and shadow decision making are
mixed. By addressing urban environmental hazards
through engineered infrastructure, state authority
materializes within seemingly banal, everyday hazard-
scapes that at once demand recognition of state power
and legitimacy (Mullenite 2019). Urban governance,
operating through clientelist logics, is extended and
embedded in sociospatially differentiated terms.
Whereas traditional conceptualizations of clientel-
ism privilege a political order abstracted from the
environmental circumstances with which it is imbri-
cated, we have argued that clientelism can only be
understood as the result of contradictory efforts to
govern nature in favor of capitalist urbanization.
Through our case studies in Brazil and Mexico, we
reveal the underpinning of contemporary clientelism
in the political-ecological material of the city, within
which repeated cycles of environmental degradation
and social exploitation reproduce unequal exchanges
of favors as the basis of state power. In this dynamic,
multiple interventions aiming to mitigate catastrophic
disasters are hazardously delivered. For the vast major-
ity of citizens, the state itself is experienced as hazard-
ous: a system of deal-making privilege that can
neither be ignored nor circumvented. The best avail-
able opportunity for those most vulnerable to environ-
mental hazards is to build clientelist ties that could
lead to a less unfavorable outcome than displacements
to urban fringes and increasing marginality.
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